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Arizona’s Torres v. Terrell and Section 318.03: The Wild 
West of Pre-Embryo Disposition 
CATHERINE WHEATLEY* 
INTRODUCTION 
A husband and wife, reeling from the wife’s cancer diagnosis, decide to undergo 
in vitro fertilization (IVF). Cancer treatment will make her infertile, unless steps are 
taken now, so they undergo egg retrieval and cryopreserve the resulting pre-embryos. 
As the couple fills out the clinic’s paperwork, they initial a standard pre-embryo 
disposition clause. The wife survives, but the marriage does not. In divorce 
proceedings, the court dissolves their relationship and divides their property—and 
must decree whether the frozen pre-embryos should go to the wife, who wants to 
have them transferred to her uterus, or the husband, who no longer wants biological 
children and would like to destroy them. Based on prior decisions from around the 
country, there are strong arguments in favor of each spouse. And yet, this court 
chooses an entirely different path: the frozen pre-embryos will go to a completely 
unknown third party.  
This is exactly what happened in a recent Arizona case, Torres v. Terrell. The 
Arizona trial court took the quintessential Solomonic approach to judicial decision-
making to a new extreme when it held that a divorcing couple with cryopreserved 
pre-embryos must donate their cryopreserved pre-embryos to a third party.1 On the 
heels of Torres, the Arizona legislature then passed a related law, title 25, section 
318.03 of the Arizona Code, specifying that when divorcing spouses disagree on pre-
embryo disposition, courts should award the pre-embryos to whichever spouse will 
“provide[] the best chance for the in vitro human embryos to develop to birth.”2 
While the statute may give cryopreserved pre-embryos—frozen, undifferentiated 
genetic material only a few days old—a slight chance at life, it sacrifices substantial 
individual interests. 
Arizona’s recent lawmaking on pre-embryo disposition promises far reaching 
legal and policy ramifications. Assisted reproductive technology (ART), a series of 
medical procedures that create cryopreserved pre-embryos, is an industry worth an 
estimated $4.5 billion3 and helps to conceive about 1.5% of U.S. babies born 
annually.4 Over 300 fertility clinics in the United States assist tens of thousands of 
couples who seek fertility treatment every year, resulting in what could be more than 
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1. See infra Section II.A.
2. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (Supp. 2018).
3. Indlieb Farazi, The Price of Life: Treating Infertility, AL JAZEERA (June 3, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/05/price-life-treating-infertility 
-160524081956257.html [https://perma.cc/5T4V-B4R3].
4. Jen Christensen, Record Number of Women Using IVF to Get Pregnant, CNN (Feb.
18, 2014, 2:36 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/17/health/record-ivf 
-use/index.html [https://perma.cc/SSV7-6JRD].
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one million frozen pre-embryos in storage.5 At the same time, the debate about when 
life begins continues to fuel some of the most contentious contemporary political 
issues.6 Thus, if the Torres ruling and section 318.03 come to be considered settled 
law, it would likely result in a sea change in other areas that implicate a view of 
embryonic personhood like abortion jurisprudence.7 An intermediate appeals court 
recently vacated the Torres trial court’s order8, and the parties have appealed to the 
Arizona Supreme Court.9 Section 318.03 has yet to be adjudicated although 
constitutional challenges seem likely.10 However, even if both the trial court ruling 
and statute are definitively rejected, they nonetheless highlight a stark reality about 
ART: so far, legal innovations have not kept pace with medical innovations.11  
In this Note, Part I examines the three main approaches used in other state 
supreme court decisions to decide pre-embryo disposition disputes, as well as three 
perspectives on the legal status of the pre-embryo, and compares them with 
Arizona’s emerging law. Part II summarizes Arizona’s Torres trial court order and 
opinion and section 318.03. Part III then analyzes whether the Torres orders and 
Arizona’s new statutory “most likely to lead to birth standard”12 present 
constitutional issues and concludes that the trial court’s order, if reinstated by the 
Arizona Supreme Court, and section 318.03 can be challenged on substantive due 
process and equal protection grounds. Finally, this Note concludes that, because the 
initial Torres ruling and section 318.03 create significant legal and policy concerns, 
in addition to constitutional concerns, patients considering IVF in Arizona should be 
very cautious.  
Before getting into the substance of the Note, it is necessary to understand the 
technology involved. First, pre-embryos are created through ART, namely, a 
procedure called in vitro fertilization. In IVF, an egg and sperm are combined outside 
of the body to form a pre-embryo, which is then transferred to a woman’s uterus. If 
the pre-embryo implants, a woman becomes pregnant.13 For thirty years, patients 
5. Jody Lyneé Madeira, “Eggs”ploding the Boundaries of Contract Law?: Current
Perspectives on Embryos and Genetic Material upon Progenitors’ Divorce 5 (Oct. 2015) 
(citation omitted) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).  
6. John Ehrenreich, Why the Abortion Debate Feels Like Such a Stalemate, SLATE (Aug.
1, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/08/why-the-abortion-debate-feels-like 
-such-a-stalemate.html [https://perma.cc/L3ZE-GHTN].
7. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, Arizona Embryo Law Could Alter Abortion Debate,
PRESS HERALD (July 17, 2018), https://www.pressherald.com/2018/07/17/arizona-embryo 
-law-could-alter-abortion-debate/ [https://perma.cc/ECQ6-VKRY] (“If a days-old embryo in
a freezer has a right to life, why not a days-old embryo in utero?”).
8. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681 (Ariz. App. Div. 2019) , review granted in part, CV-
19-0106-PR, 2019 Ariz. LEXIS 226 (Ariz. Aug. 27, 2019). 
9. Id.
10. See Gary A. Debele & Susan L. Crockin, Legal Issues Surrounding Embryos and
Gametes: What Family Law Practitioners Need to Know, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW. 55, 106 (2018).  
11. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved
Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169, 181 
(2004).  
12. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (Supp. 2018).
13. See, e.g., In Vitro Fertilization, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests
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have been able to cryopreserve, or freeze, any surplus pre-embryos that are not 
transferred.14 Because egg retrieval is expensive and invasive, and less than half of 
all transfers result in live births,15 cryopreservation allows patients to undergo IVF 
once and use the resulting pre-embryos in subsequent cycles, thus avoiding repeated 
retrievals.16  
To avoid inaccuracy, this Note uses the word “pre-embryo” throughout. 
Depending upon how many days after fertilization transfer or cryopreservation 
occurs (usually two to five days), “pre-embryo” describes the fertilized egg that 
ranges in development from a four-to-eight-cell organism to a blastocyst with 
hundreds of cells, ripe for implantation.17 At any point past the blastocyst stage, the 
embryo’s next generation of development is wholly dependent upon interaction with 
the uterus.18 Thus, cryopreservation must occur at an earlier stage of development, 
before the pre-embryo is ready to implant and this critical interaction with the uterus 
takes place; in other words, before the pre-embryo becomes an embryo.19 This 
scientific distinction, observed here and causing the Davis v. Davis court, 
adjudicating an early pre-disposition dispute, to conclude that “[i]t is for this reason 
that it is appropriate to refer to the developing entity up to this point as a preembryo, 
rather than an embryo,”20 is nonetheless not universally followed in legal contexts, 
including statutory law.21 The use of “pre-embryo” here only reflects a desire for 
accuracy and is not meant to imply that pre-embryos do not have a special potential. 
This Note also uses the term “gamete providers” to describe the individuals who 
provide the egg and sperm that form the pre-embryo. Finally, “pre-embryo donation” 
refers to the process by which gamete providers donate their surplus pre-embryos to 
a third party,22 essentially providing the opportunity for a woman to “give birth to an 
‘adopted’ child.”23 
-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac-20384716 [https://perma.cc/P9DF-A42N].
14. See COMM. TO CONSIDER SOC., ETHICAL & LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION, STATE OF VICTORIA, REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED BY
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 11–12 (1984) [hereinafter STATE OF VICTORIA]. 
15. NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, 2015 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 44 (2017). Success rates 
differ substantially by age. For instance, for transfers of fresh nondonor eggs, the rate of live 
birth is 46.5% for women under thirty-five while at thirty-seven and forty, the rates are 38.4% 
and 27.4%, respectively. Id. at 5. For the same ages, the respective rates of live births are 
48.7%, 44.5%, and 40% for frozen transfers. Id. 
16. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1259 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Kindregan
& McBrien, supra note 11, at 171 & n.5. 
17. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (citing the American Fertility
Society); Sarah A. Weber, Dismantling the Dictated Moral Code: Modifying Louisiana's In 
Vitro Fertilization Statutes to Protect Patients’ Procreative Liberty, 51 LOY. L. REV. 549, 551 
n.3 (2005).
18. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594.
19. See id.
20. Id. (quoting the American Fertility Society) (emphasis omitted).
21. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (Supp. 2018).
22. See Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 11, at 172.
23. Id.
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I. THREE APPROACHES TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRE-EMBRYOS AND PRE-EMBRYO
DISPOSITION DISPUTES 
Torres and section 318.03 came to life against a backdrop of pre-embryo 
dissolution disputes in other states over the past thirty years that have considered 
several issues, including the pre-embryo’s legal status and which doctrinal approach 
should resolve the dispute.24 Pre-embryo disposition jurisprudence in the United 
States shows three main perspectives on the legal status of pre-embryos25 and three 
main doctrinal approaches.26  
A. The Legal Status of Pre-Embryos
Courts adjudicating pre-embryo dissolution disputes have employed three 
different perspectives on the legal status of pre-embryos: (1) pre-embryos as 
property, (2) pre-embryos as people, and (3) pre-embryos as potential person.27 
1. Pre-Embryos as Property
Several states employ a pre-embryos-as-property approach, which is also 
supported by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).28 Property 
as a legal concept is a bundle of rights that includes control, possession, use, 
exclusion, profit, and disposition.29 Under this approach, pre-embryos are the 
property of their gamete providers,30 and so their destruction and use depends 
completely upon the gamete providers’ consent.31 This approach was applied in York 
v. Jones, when a couple sued a fertility clinic after it refused to release their pre-
embryos.32 Denying the fertility clinic’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the
clinic was acting as the bailee of the frozen pre-embryos and must return them to
their gamete providers.33
The pre-embryos as property approach is criticized because, in other doctrinal 
areas, courts have found that people do not have property rights in their excised 
tissues. For instance, in Moore v. Regents of the University of California, after 
Moore’s spleen was removed during treatment for hairy cell leukemia, doctors 
learned it was valuable and created a cell line (i.e. a culture of cells) without 
24. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588.
25. Cf. id. at 597.
26. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Iowa 2003).
27. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
28. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989); Kindregan & McBrien,
supra note 11, at 186. 
29. Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law with Advances in Reproductive Science, 6
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 73, 75 (1995); see Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 11, at 186. 
30. Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 11, at 186.
31. Jennifer P. Brown, Comment, “Unwanted, Anonymous, Biological Descendants”:
Mandatory Donation Laws and Laws Prohibiting Preembryo Discard Violate the 
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 183, 195 (1993). 
32. York, 717 F. Supp. at 424.
33. Id. at 425, 429.
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informing Moore.34 Moore sued his treatment team and the hospital on the grounds 
that he had a property interest in the cell line, but the California Supreme Court found 
that he did not have an interest because he did not have a property right in his spleen 
after its removal.35 However, some scholars argue that allowing a property right in 
body parts—or specifically, reproductive matter—simply means acknowledging that 
responsibility for pre-embryos as property is “a complex bundle of rights, duties, 
powers and immunities.”36 Under this view, “the pruning away of some or a great 
many of these elements does not entirely destroy the title.”37 Regardless, viewing 
pre-embryo disposition through a property lens is complicated because both gamete 
providers have equal ownership interests in the pre-embryos.38 
Critics also say that the pre-embryo-as-property approach marginalizes its life 
potential because likening a pre-embryo to inanimate objects is demeaning to the 
pre-embryo.39 This is largely a semantic distinction, however, because even critics 
of the approach may still agree in the end that decision-making authority rests with 
the gamete providers.40  
While the Torres trial court engaged in a discussion of whether the pre-embryo is 
a person under law, the court of appeals avoided any overt mention of this analysis. 
But, its view on the status of pre-embryos is suggested by a footnote that reads: “In 
this case, the parties treated the embryos as joint property pursuant to statute, see 
A.R.S. § 25-318(A) (authorizing the court in a dissolution proceeding to divide 
property held in common equitably, though not necessarily in kind), although they 
could have simply brought a contract action.”41 The fact that the court identifies the 
analysis as being one of property division while also pointing out that it could have 
been resolved as an ordinary contract action is most suggestive of a pre-embryos-as 
property-approach.  
2. Pre-Embryos as People
To date, Louisiana is the only state to explicitly adopt a pre-embryos-as-people 
approach.42 This approach views pre-embryos as genetically unique and therefore 
entitled to full legal rights as persons under the law.43 A 1986 Louisiana statute 
34. 793 P.2d 479, 480–81 (Cal. 1990).
35. Id. at 489. Of course, the California Supreme Court was concerned in part with the
policy implications for medical research and organ donation, see id. at 487, and the policy 
interests of pre-embryo disposition are likely different.  
36. E.g., Brown, supra note 29, at 75 (quoting People v. Walker, 90 P.2d. 854, 855 (Cal.
App. 1939)). “[E]ven the possessor of contraband has certain property rights in it against 
anyone other than the state.” (citing Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509–10 
(Cal. 1990)).  
37. Id. (quoting People v. Walker, 90 P.2d. 854, 855 (Cal. App. 1939)).
38. Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 11, at 185.
39. Brown, supra note 31, at 197.
40. Id.; Weber, supra note 17, at 563.
41. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 684 n.2 (Ariz. App. Div. 2019).
42. Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and
Proposed State Regulation, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407, 412 (2013). 
43. See Weber, supra note 17, at 562.
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establishes that a pre-embryo is a “juridical person”44 and a “biological human 
being.”45 Because Louisiana asserts that personhood begins at conception, it 
prohibits the destruction of pre-embryos and pre-embryonic research.46 Using a “best 
interest of the [pre-embryo]” standard,47 Louisiana also mandates donation if gamete 
providers give up their parental rights.48  
New Mexico has a similar statute, enacted in 1985, but stops short of stating that 
a pre-embryo is a person. Instead, New Mexico requires that all pre-embryos created 
through IVF must be transferred.49 Remarkably, neither Louisiana’s nor New 
Mexico’s statutes have been challenged.50  
Elsewhere, personhood bills, though largely unsuccessful, continue to be 
proposed in state and federal legislatures. For instance, in the five years between 
2013 and 2018, over one hundred personhood bills were proposed by state 
legislators.51 Congress last considered a personhood bill expanding the legal 
definition of a person in January of 2017.52 The bill, titled the “Sanctity of Human 
Life Act,” provided that life begins at fertilization.53 However, outside of Louisiana, 
federal and state personhood bills have consistently failed.54  
According to scholars, scientists, and jurists, treating pre-embryos as people is 
deeply problematic because it ignores the scientific fact that pre-embryos are 
developmentally distinct from persons who are fully protected under the law.55 This 
critique largely rests on the fact that pre-embryos, at such an undeveloped stage, are 
small groups of undifferentiated cells that are incomparable with a developed fetus 
or baby.56 When cryopreservation is performed, for instance, a pre-embryo does not 
have a central nervous system, a brain or any other organs, or the ability to feel pain.57 
These characteristics, requisite for life, cannot develop until implantation.58  
In addition, critics note that pre-embryos only have a five–to–eight–percent 
chance of survival59 and most often stop developing naturally, which is widely 
considered a cellular loss, not a death.60 Finally, critics point out that multiple forms 
44. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (1986).
45. Id. § 9:126.
46. Id. § 9:129.
47. Id. § 9:131.
48. Id. § 9:130.
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1 (2007).
50. Howell, supra note 42, at 413.
51. Legislative Tracker: Personhood, REWIRE.NEWS (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/personhood/ [https://perma.cc/VYB7-
WYUN]. 
52. See Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 586, 115th Cong. (2017).
53. Id. § 2.
54. See Maya Manian, Lessons from Personhood's Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side
Effects on Women's Health, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 75, 77 (2013). 
55. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 31, at 195.
56. See id. at 222.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Howell, supra note 42, at 413; Weber, supra note 17, at 564–65.
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of birth control are legally used to destroy “pre-embryos” in the body.61 For instance, 
Plan B, a popular birth control, prevents a fertilized ovum from implanting.62 This 
causes commentators to question why IVF pre-embryos should be granted legal 
protections that exceed those granted to corporal “pre-embryos.”63 In fact, in many 
other contexts, the legal system has largely rejected the extension of all laws to 
fetuses, which are significantly more developed than pre-embryos.64 Finally, critics 
argue that such an approach violates the privacy doctrine established by the U.S. 
Supreme Court,65 an idea that will be explored more fully in Part III.  
While Arizona stops short of explicitly granting pre-embryos personhood, the 
Torres trial court ruling and section 318.03 implicate a pre-embryo-as-people 
perspective. Courts that do not employ this view balance only the gamete providers’ 
interests against each other.66 However, the trial court’s reasoning elevates the pre-
embryo’s interests over the rights of either gamete provider, and section 318.03 
grants the state’s perception of the pre-embryo’s interests more weight than those of 
the spouse favoring destruction. The only reason why a state would take that 
approach, especially given that a state’s typical interest in marriage dissolution is to 
give spouses the cleanest separation possible, is to further the premise that pre-
embryos are entitled to the same protections as other lives in being.  
3. Pre-Embryo as Potential Person
The most common of the three approaches to embryo disposition is pre-embryo-
as-potential-person, which accords pre-embryos special status because of their 
potential to develop into humans but does not grant them personhood.67 This 
approach was used in deciding such key pre-embryo disposition cases as Davis v. 
Davis68 and A.Z. v. B.Z.,69 as well as by multiple advisory boards, including the U.S. 
Ethics Advisory Board.70  
In Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court did not consider pre-embryos persons 
because they have not implanted, are not viable, and have not been born.71 The Davis 
court did not consider the pre-embryos property out of concern that this approach 
was demeaning,72 but instead created a middle ground: “special respect because of 
61. Howell, supra note 42, at 413.
62. How Plan B Works, PLAN B ONE-STEP, https://www.planbonestep.com/how-plan-b
-works/ [https://perma.cc/ZGC8-4PFK].
63. Howell, supra note 42, at 413.
64. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973) (finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to a fetus). 
65. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 17, at 584.
66. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001). One question of interest, albeit
one not addressed here, is whether such courts ignore pre-embryos’ interests or merely 
consider them only insofar as those interests are conflated with those of their gamete providers. 
67. See Brown, supra note 31, at 198.
68. See 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
69. 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000).
70. See Brown, supra note 31, at 197–98.
71. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594–95 (Tenn. 1992).
72. See id. at 595.
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their potential for human life.”73 Using this approach, the Davis court gave the 
gamete provider who wanted to avoid genetic parenthood the right to choose the pre-
embryos’ disposition.74 In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed with 
the Davis court on this approach because it allowed courts to avoid applying laws 
involving child custody and personal property, which it considered inapposite areas 
of law.75 
Critics of the “special respect” approach argue it lacks utility because it does not 
dictate an outcome, and pre-embryos should either have rights or should not.76 Critics 
also deem this approach vague and fear it may lean too far toward giving pre-
embryos personhood, which would be inaccurate since, scientifically, life has not yet 
begun.77 
In summary, despite multiple rulings, the legal status of pre-embryos remains 
unsettled. It will remain so until the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari to a pre-
embryo case. Since the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that fetuses are 
entitled to full legal rights,78 however, and since pre-embryos are radically less 
developed than fetuses, the Court is not likely to find that pre-embryos are entitled 
to legal personhood.  
B. Approaches to Pre-Embryo Disposition Disputes
  Defining a pre-embryo’s status is not enough; courts also must decide which 
doctrinal approach to pre-embryo disposition cases to employ. There are three 
different approaches here as well: (1) the contract approach, (2) the contemporaneous 
agreement approach, and (3) the balancing test approach.79 
1. The Contract Approach
The prevailing view takes a contract approach.80 Under this view, disposition 
agreements entered into before IVF are enforceable if they do not violate public 
policy.81 For instance, in 1992, the pre-embryo disposition agreement was “critical” 
to the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Davis, and the court 
presumptively favored enforcing such agreements.82 While the court recognized that 
parties’ feelings over personal decisions like pre-embryo disposition might change 
73. Id. at 597.
74. Id. at 604.
75. See 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000).
76. Brown, supra note 31, at 199.
77. Id.
78. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
79. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Iowa 2003).
80. Id. at 776.
81. Id.
82. Tracy Haslett, Note, J.B v. M.B.: The Enforcement of Disposition Contracts and the
Competing Interests of the Right to Procreate and the Right Not to Procreate Where Donors 
of Genetic Material Dispute the Disposition of Unused Preembryos, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & 
TECH. J. 195, 203–04 (2001).  
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over time, it held that absent any subsequent modifications, prior agreements should 
hold.83 
A few years later in Kass v. Kass, the New York Court of Appeals enforced a 
consent form, signed by both gamete providers, that transferred possession of their 
pre-embryos to the fertility clinic if the gamete providers could not agree on 
disposition.84 The Kass court also ruled that pre-embryo disposition agreements 
should be presumptively valid, and prioritized them because they “maximize 
procreative liberty” by limiting the state’s involvement in decision-making, and 
because they avoid litigation costs.85 Finally, the Kass court opined that this approach 
encouraged parties to be deliberate in using IVF, to be deliberate in making related 
decisions, and to take their consent seriously.86 
More recent courts have also used this approach. In the 2002 case Litowitz v. 
Litowitz, the Washington Supreme Court settled a disposition disagreement, relying 
only on a cryopreservation agreement, by holding that under the contract terms the 
pre-embryos should have been destroyed after five years.87 The court so held even 
though the husband provided sperm and the wife did not provide gametes, specifying 
that “[a]ny right [the wife] may have to the preembryos must be based solely upon 
contract.”88  
One problem with the contract approach is that the line between informed-consent 
documents, disposition agreements, and contracts is blurry. Informed-consent 
documents are primarily intended for education, disclosure, and recording consent.89 
In a contract, however, the parties exchange bargained-for promises. Conflating an 
informed-consent document with a contract is problematic because it confuses who 
is promising what to whom and because it is unclear to what extent consent and 
disposition documents are contractual, and therefore binding on both parties, 
especially if the agreements are merely boilerplate or contracts of adhesion.90  
Such agreements do not mutually affect outcomes, but merely reflect one party 
specifying what will be done. The fact that patients are typically unable to bargain 
for changes in standard consent forms suggests that treating the documents as arms-
length contracts is problematic, despite its prevalence.91 It is also unclear whether an 
informed-consent document between a fertility patient and care provider should bind 
a third party, even if it is a third-party spouse. For instance, in Torres, Torres was the 
patient, but usually contracts will bind the “nonpatient” spouse who initialed as 
well.92 Moreover, should Terrell’s initial on the agreement between Torres and the 
83. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
84. See 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
85. Id. at 180.
86. Id.
87. 48 P.3d 261, 271 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).
88. Id. at 262, 267.
89. JODY LYNEÉ MADEIRA, TAKING BABY STEPS: HOW PATIENTS AND FERTILITY CLINICS 
COLLABORATE IN CONCEPTION 187 (2018). 
90. See id. at 196.
91. See id.
92. See infra Part II.A.1; Rowlette v. Mortimer, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1024 (D. Idaho
2018) (considering whether giving a sperm sample makes someone a patient of a fertility 
specialist).  
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fertility clinic represent a binding agreement between he and Torres? To avoid these 
questions, exclusive bilateral disposition contracts between the gamete providers (or 
other prospective parents), representing their “dickered” bargain, would help lend 
clarity to the parties’ wishes, follow them from clinic to clinic, and support the 
contract approach to disposition disputes.   
The Torres trial court flirted with a contract approach, although its treatment is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, there is ample indication in the court’s explicit 
reasoning that if the court had found the contract to be an unambiguous expression 
of the parties’ intent, it would have honored that intent.93 But, it is unclear whether 
the trial court correctly concluded that the section H provision was ambiguous and 
why the court then ultimately resolved the dispute with one of the selected options, 
pre-embryo donation, if it was not following the contract.94 In contrast, the Torres 
appeals court situates its analysis from a contracts approach, supplementing with a 
balancing test when the agreement is ambiguous or when the agreement grants 
decision-making authority to the courts.95 
While both courts at least implicated the contract approach, section 318.03 
indicates a legislative desire to override, not effectuate, the parties’ intent. The 
relevant section reads, “[i]f an agreement between the spouses concerning the 
disposition of the in vitro human embryos is brought before the court . . . the court 
shall award the in vitro human embryos [to the spouse intending to give birth].”96 In 
addition, while the Litowitz court treated both the gamete-providing spouse and the 
non-gamete-providing spouse as equals,97 section 318.03 requires that if both 
spouses “intend to allow the in vitro human embryos to develop to birth” but only 
one spouse is a gamete provider, then the gamete-providing spouse will be awarded 
the pre-embryos.98  
In large part, the dispute over whether to employ a contractual approach to 
disposition agreements maps onto the debate about whether such agreements, like 
contracts pertaining to family relationships, inherently violate public policy.99 
Typically, courts will not enforce marital contracts that deal with matters or relations 
“essential to the marital relationship,” specifically, agreements to bear children, on 
grounds of public policy.100 Pre-embryo disposition courts and commentators that 
93. See Decree of Dissolution of Marriage at 14, Torres v. Terrell, FN 2016-001785
(Super. Ct. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Dissolution Decree] (“This Court believes that 
where the parties entered into a written contract regarding the issue, the Court should 
commence its analysis by applying the contract if possible to assist in determining the 
disposition of the embryos.”).  
94. See infra Section II.A.1.
95. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 690 (Ariz. App. Div. 2019).
96. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03(B) (Supp. 2018).
97. See supra text accompanying note 86.
98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03(A)(3) (Supp. 2018).
99. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 42, at 415 (“Professor John Robertson contends that
gamete donors who voluntarily and advisedly enter into a contract prior to IVF regarding the 
disposition of unused embryos should be able to rely upon the enforcement of the agreement. 
Professor Carl H. Coleman maintains that contracts concerning family relationships violate 
public policy and are unenforceable upon a change of mind by either party.”). 
100. THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS
ON CONTRACTS 25 (7th ed. 2016). 
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favor enforcement advocate a contracts approach and do not see a violation of public 
policy, whereas those that oppose enforcement are likely to see a violation and favor 
a contemporaneous agreement approach.101 
2. The Contemporaneous Agreement Approach 
Only a small minority of states have employed the contemporaneous agreement 
approach to pre-embryo disputes.102 Like the contract approach, the 
contemporaneous agreement approach maintains that decisions about pre-embryo 
disposition belong equally to the gamete providers.103 However, the 
contemporaneous agreement approach differs from the contract approach in that it 
allows the parties to invalidate the prior agreement if one party unilaterally has a 
change of heart—at any point.104  
As a result, this approach requires that courts not mandate any further action until 
the parties reach mutual consent.105 In In re Witten, the Iowa Supreme Court 
explained that, because procreative decisions are “intensely emotional,” people may 
“act more on the basis of feeling and instinct than rational deliberation.”106 As a 
result, the court reasoned, it might not be possible to make an informed decision 
“relinquish[ing] a right in advance of the time the right is to be exercised.”107 The In 
re Witten court, analogizing to the validity of contemporaneous divorce 
stipulations,108 opines that doing so avoids problematic policy concerns that would 
otherwise be implicated, because parties who can change their minds are not being 
contractually forced into a familial relationship but rather make a mutual decision to 
be implemented immediately.109 
Critics lament that this approach undermines the integrity of agreements between 
gamete providers. Haslett says that even the J.B. v. M.B. court’s contracts limitation 
that allows parties to make subsequent modifications up until the point of litigation 
“eliminat[es] the vital security which contracts provide.”110 As a result, alarm at the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. Compare Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180–81 (N.Y. 1998) (favoring a contracts 
approach), with In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777–78 (Iowa 2003) (favoring a 
contemporaneous agreement approach). 
 102. See Michael T. Flannery, “Rethinking” Embryo Disposition upon Divorce, 29 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 233 n.3 (2013).  
 103. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777 (quoting Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and 
Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 55, 81 (1999)). 
 104. See id. at 778 (quoting Coleman, supra note 103, at 110). 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. at 777 (quoting Coleman, supra note 103, at 98). For a discussion of the 
problematic view of infertility patients as emotional and desperate, see MADEIRA, supra note 
89, at 71–73. 
 107. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777 (quoting Coleman, supra note 103, at 98). 
 108. Id. at 781–82.  
 109. Id. at 779–83. This is similar reasoning but a different conclusion to that used by the 
A.Z. v. B.Z. court, which avoids public policy violations by allowing parties to subsequently 
modify their disposition agreements up until the point of the disposition proceedings. See A.Z. 
v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057–59 (Mass. 2000).  
 110. Haslett, supra note 82, at 196–97.  
310 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:299 
 
contemporaneous agreement approach, which not only extends the unilateral right to 
withdraw from a predisposition agreement to any point but also prohibits the court 
from acting without mutual agreement, is necessarily greater.  
3. The Balancing Test Approach 
Other courts have opted to balance the gamete providers’ interests. Similar to the 
contemporaneous agreement approach, courts applying a balancing test recognize 
that disposition agreements are enforceable until either party changes their mind 
about disposition prior to the pre-embryos’ award to one party.111 In contrast to the 
contemporaneous agreement approach, however, courts will not wait for parties to 
reach a mutual agreement, but will balance the parties’ interests to decide the best 
result.112 Other courts, like the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Rooks, 
only use the balancing approach if there is no contract, or if the contract does not 
address disposition.113 In balancing the parties’ interests, courts typically give greater 
weight to the party who wishes to avoid procreation.114 
For instance, in J.B. v. M.B., where a divorcing husband wanted to use the pre-
embryos and the wife did not, the New Jersey Supreme Court avoided the state’s 
limitations on contracts pertaining to family relationships for public policy reasons 
by recognizing that both parties had a right to change their minds.115 The court found 
that the consent form was not a memorialization of the divorcing couple’s intentions, 
allowing the court to determine the pre-embryos’ disposition.116  
The husband and wife also asserted constitutional rights to procreate and not 
procreate, respectively.117 The husband argued that his right to procreate outweighed 
his wife’s right not to procreate because her bodily integrity was not implicated by 
the pre-embryos’ transfer to someone else’s uterus.118 The husband also argued that 
his religious convictions as well as the state’s interest in protecting life outweighed 
the wife’s interest.119 Ultimately, the New Jersey court agreed with the Tennessee 
court in Davis that the party avoiding procreation should usually prevail if the other 
party can procreate without the pre-embryos.120 While a few lower courts have sided 
with the partner who wishes to procreate, this is not the prevailing view, and has not 
been used by any state supreme courts.121 
Turning to Arizona, despite the Torres court’s reliance on J.B. v. M.B. in 
attempting to balance interests, the test in J.B. v. M.B. is different because it weighs 
only the gamete providers’ interests, and does not include the state’s or pre-embryo’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. See id. at 201–02.  
 112. See id. 
 113. 429 P.3d 579, 581, 586 (Colo. 2018).  
 114. Haslett, supra note 82, at 202.  
 115. 783 A.2d 707, 710, 718–19 (N.J. 2001). 
 116. Id. at 714. 
 117. See id. at 712. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 716. 
 121. Madeira, supra note 5, at 20–24. 
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interests in making its determination.122 It is not clear from the Torres order why, in 
contrast to past applications of the balancing test, the Arizona court considered the 
state’s and pre-embryo’s interests as equal, or perhaps greater, than the interests of 
Torres and Terrell. The balancing test used by the Arizona Court of Appeals, 
however, by discarding the influence of Arizona’s “strong family values” statute, 
used a balancing test that was closer to that employed by other courts undertaking to 
balance the parties’ interests. On the other hand, while the trial court’s holding was 
consistent with the prevailing view that the interests of the party wishing to avoid 
procreation would normally outweigh the interests of the party wishing to procreate, 
the court of appeals’ holding, by granting the pre-embryos to Torres, clearly favored 
the interests of the party wishing to procreate.  
 II. ARIZONA’S TORRES V. TERRELL AND SECTION 318.03 
The struggle of legal systems to address the challenges that surplus cryopreserved 
pre-embryos pose dates back to the case of an American couple that died in a plane 
crash in 1984, leaving two frozen pre-embryos in Melbourne, Australia, and no 
disposition agreement to guide disposal.123 Decades later, the interests and issues 
identified in this incident remain so deeply personal, philosophical, and unresolved 
that it was perhaps inevitable that cryopreserved pre-embryos would be subject to 
case law and statutes, like those in Arizona, that bear the marks of a pluralistic society 
trying to resolve fundamentally conflicting views. This does not mean, however, that 
the Arizona standards are workable or wise. 
A. Torres v. Terrell  
As discussed below, the trial court’s ruling in Torres v. Terrell was highly 
problematic. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was challenged, and the Arizona Court of 
Appeals issued an order in March 2019 to vacate the trial court’s ruling.124 The 
analyses of both courts are discussed in turn. 
1. Trial Court 
In the 2017 Torres case, the trial judge mandated involuntary donation of the pre-
embryos in question to a third party, instead of to the gamete providers,125 Ruby 
Torres and John Terrell, a couple with an on-again, off-again relationship of ten 
years.126 In 2014, shortly after Torres was diagnosed with breast cancer, the couple 
decided to undergo IVF in order to cryopreserve their pre-embryos so that Torres 
could preserve her ability to have genetically related children posttreatment.127 As 
part of the routine paperwork outlining their relationship with the fertility clinic, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. See infra text accompanying note 148. 
 123. See STATE OF VICTORIA, supra note 14, at 5. 
 124. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 694 (Ariz. App. Div. 2019), review granted in 
part, CV-19-0106-PR, 2019 Ariz. LEXIS 226 (Ariz. Aug. 27, 2019). 
 125. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 21. 
 126. Id. at 7. 
 127. Id. at 7–8. 
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couple signed a predisposition agreement form.128 A few days later, the couple 
married.129  
After undergoing IVF, but before transferring any of their pre-embryos, Torres 
and Terrell then decided to divorce and disagreed about what to do with the pre-
embryos.130 Terrell wanted the embryos to be discarded or remain frozen unless the 
parties came to an agreement.131 Torres wanted to gestate the pre-embryos herself 
because she was unlikely to be able to have biological children without them 
following her cancer treatment.132  
The state trial court, noting that there was no law on point, used both contract 
principles and Arizona policy concerns to analyze and decide the case.133 
Referencing cases in other states like Davis v. Davis,134 Kass v. Kass,135 and A.Z. v. 
B.Z.,136 where courts began by interpreting the pre-embryo disposition contract,137 
the Arizona court found that the “Embryo Cryopreservation & Embryo Disposition” 
agreement between the fertility clinic, Torres, and Terrell was ambiguous and could 
not be used to resolve the issue.138 Nonetheless, the court isolated a few sections that 
informed its decision.139 The most relevant section reads as follows: 
H. Divorce or Dissolution of Relationship 
 
In the event the patient and her spouse are divorced or the patient and her 
partner dissolve their relationship, we agree that the embryos should be 
disposed of in the following manner (check one box only): 
 
A court decree and/or settlement agreement will be presented to the 
Clinic directing use to achieve a pregnancy in one of us or donation to 
another couple for that purpose.140 
The box next to the court decree option was checked and initialed by both Torres and 
Terrell.141  
Another clause on page thirteen of the agreement, however, appeared to conflict 
with this choice. That clause states that after divorce, the pre-embryos cannot be used 
by either party “without the express, written consent of both parties.”142 The parties 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. Id. at 7. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 8–9. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 11–16. 
 134. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).  
 135. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).  
 136. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).  
 137. See supra Part I(b)(1). 
 138. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 13–16. 
 139. Id. at 11–12. 
 140. Notice of Filing of Copy of Contract with Bloom Reproductive Institute at 16, Terrell 
v. Torres, No. FN 2016-001785 (filed May 12, 2017) [hereinafter Disposition Agreement].  
 141. Id.  
 142. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 16. 
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made no individualized notation to this part of the agreement although both Torres 
and Terrell initialed at the bottom of the page, which contained a number of 
provisions and four separately numbered sections.143 Despite finding that the contract 
contained contradictory clauses, the court concluded that the parties did not intend 
for any surplus pre-embryos to be destroyed.144  
The court then referenced Davis and New Jersey Supreme Court case J.B. v. 
M.B.,145 and attempted to apply a balancing test.146 This balancing test, as employed 
by other courts, has balanced the interests of the two gamete providers.147 The 
Arizona court, however, included the pre-embryos’ interests under the “best interests 
of the child” standard, even after acknowledging that a pre-embryo is not a child.148 
The Torres court also purportedly based its ruling on statutory language, current 
scientific knowledge about pre-embryo development, the unresolved debate about 
when life begins, and judicial restraint.149 
Despite finding that a pre-embryo is not a child, the Torres court muddied the 
waters by considering three Arizona policies concerning children and families: (1) 
“promot[ing] strong families”; (2) “promot[ing] strong family values”; and (3) 
establishing that a child’s best interest, in the absence of contrary evidence, is served 
by “hav[ing] substantial, frequent, meaningful and continuing parenting time with 
both parents” and “hav[ing] both parents participate in decision making about the 
child.”150 The court said that giving the pre-embryos to Torres would violate these 
policies because the parents were unlikely to effectively co-parent, and Terrell did 
not want to procreate with Torres.151 Later, the court asserted that, while it would not 
get involved in co-parenting disputes before a child exists, it would nonetheless be 
contrary to public policy to rule in such a way that Torres and Terrell would litigate 
future parenting disputes.152  
2. Court of Appeals 
In October 2017, Torres appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and oral 
arguments took place in June 2018.153 On appeal, Torres argued that the disposition 
agreement was not ambiguous, and that even if it was, the court incorrectly applied 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. Disposition Agreement, supra note 140, at 13. 
 144. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 14. 
 145. Id. at 18. 
 146. Id. at 18–20.  
 147. See infra text accompanying notes 164–69. 
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 149. See Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 12–13. 
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 153. Appeal Docket, Terrell v. Torres, 1 CA-CV 17-0617 FC (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2017) 
(on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
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the balancing test.154 Torres first asserted that the court erred in finding ambiguity in 
the agreement because section H was part of the “dickered deal,” as demonstrated by 
the fact that Torres and Terrell selected their chosen option.155 In contrast, the 
language in paragraph 10 of the agreement was simply boilerplate language included 
on behalf of the fertility clinic.156 Thus, Torres argued, the “dickered” section H 
should override the boilerplate language in paragraph 10.157 Torres then claimed that 
the trial court misapplied the balancing test since,158 by awarding the pre-embryos to 
a third party, the court incorrectly included third-party interests when only the 
spouses’ interests should be considered.159 On appeal, Terrell changed his stance 
from requesting disposal to third-party donation.160 In reply, Torres contended that 
the court erroneously balanced the spouses’ interests in giving Terrell’s desire not to 
procreate more weight than Torres’s desire to procreate.161  
Not surprisingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision hinged on how it treated 
the disposition agreement.162 It might have been supposed, however, that if the court 
found the agreement to be unambiguous, it would uphold the lower court’s ruling 
because the trial court opted for one of the options specified in the agreement. While 
the dissent takes this view, the majority did not.163 On the other hand, it might be 
supposed that if the court found the agreement ambiguous, it would grapple with 
applying a balancing test. Yet, while the majority concluded that under Arizona law, 
it must give weight to specific contract provisions over general provisions,164 a point 
of law with which the dissent agreed,165 they split on application,166 with the majority 
concluding that “[s]ubsection H unambiguously governs disposition of the embryos 
by providing the written consent to overcome the more general ‘Note.’ In making the 
choice to allow the court to determine the disposition, the court was required to 
employ the balancing approach.”167  
Applying a balancing test anew, the appeals court held that the pre-embryos 
should be awarded to Torres,168 one of the two choices specified in section H.169 After 
reviewing the three dominant approaches to pre-embryo disputes, the court of 
appeals adopted the contracts approach with the balancing test resolving situations 
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where there is “no prior agreement, or if the agreement leaves the decision to the 
court.”170  
The court of appeals’ application of the balancing test was significantly different 
from the trial court’s application. First, the court of appeals explicitly rejected any 
use of Arizona’s family values policies. In a footnote, the court of appeals disagreed 
with the trial court’s conclusion that litigation over any future children was 
unavoidable and found that the statute containing the policy objective of 
“promot[ing] strong families [and] . . . strong family values” was “inapplicable.”171 
The dissent agreed with the majority on this point.172 
Second, the court of appeals determined that the trial court erred, as a matter of 
law, in considering the right of procreational autonomy in the context of the 
balancing test.173 Even though the trial court was unclear as to whether there was a 
right not to procreate, it nonetheless concluded that Terrell’s “right not to be 
compelled to be a parent outweigh[ed] [Torres’s] right to procreate.”174 The court of 
appeals said that this framework was not useful in pre-embryo disposition disputes 
because “constitutional rights are directed at protecting an individual against 
government intrusion on personal decisions regarding reproduction.”175 The court 
justified this statement by saying that Torres and Terrell “empowered the court” to 
decide their pre-embryo dispute, and thus, the trial court should not have considered 
these constitutional rights.176  
At the same, the court of appeals seemingly adopted the prevailing view that the 
interests of the parent wishing not to procreate would normally outweigh the interests 
of the parent wishing to procreate. The court said, “we agree with other jurisdictions 
that the party who does not wish to become a parent should prevail if the other party 
has a ‘reasonable possibility’ of becoming a parent without the use of the 
embryos.”177 The dissent criticized the majority on this point, stating that while this 
case does not present the typical government intrusion on personal reproductive 
decisions, the majority “err[ed] by separating the parties’ rights from the interests 
protected by those rights.”178 
Third, the courts differed in how they weighted Torres’s interest in having 
children. The court of appeals pointed out the apparent inconsistency in the trial court 
finding that Torres had less than a one percent chance of having biological children, 
but nonetheless concluding that the “mere possibility” of having biological children 
tipped the balance against Torres.179 The court of appeals then discussed how 
unlikely it was that Torres would be able to have biological children even through 
adoption, both because there was expert testimony that there were a limited number 
of embryos available for adoption and because Torres’s medical history made it 
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unlikely.180 Largely because of this fact, despite adopting the general view “that the 
party who does not wish to become a parent should prevail if the other party has a 
‘reasonable possibility’ of becoming a parent without the use of the embryos,” the 
court of appeals held that Torres’s interest in the pre-embryos outweighed Terrell’s 
interest.181  
B. Section 318.03  
Section 318.03, passed in March 2018,182 provides that pre-embryos will be 
awarded in divorce dissolutions to the spouse “who intends to allow the in vitro 
human embryos to develop to birth.”183 When both spouses have this intention but 
only one donated gametes, the pre-embryos will be awarded to the gamete 
provider.184 The law also contains a contract override provision so that “[i]f an 
agreement between the spouses concerning the disposition of the in vitro human 
embryos is brought before the court in [divorce proceedings], the court shall award 
the in vitro human embryos” to the spouse intending to bring the pre-embryos to 
birth; thus, Arizona has adopted a most likely to lead to birth standard for pre-embryo 
disposition disputes, notwithstanding contractual agreements to the contrary.185 
Moreover, section 318.03 takes the additional step of defining parental rights and 
responsibilities—something that judicial opinions in pre-embryo divorce disputes 
have not done. The law specifies that whichever spouse is not awarded the pre-
embryos loses all parental rights and obligations unless the spouse is a gamete 
provider and consents in writing to parenthood.186 This legislative mandate is an 
update to the Torres order, which stated that Torres could not waive a child support 
claim of Terrell and noted that there was no mechanism in Arizona, such as the 
Uniform Parentage Act, to relieve a spouse of parental responsibilities.187 The 
Arizona legislature goes on to say that without this consent, any resulting children 
are deprived of all rights and obligations.188 Finally, gamete providers who do not 
consent to parenthood are required to provide detailed health and family history 
information to the spouse who is awarded the pre-embryos.189  
While section 318.03 has yet to be considered by any court, had it been in effect 
when the trial court was deciding Torres, the court almost certainly would have 
settled the case by awarding the pre-embryos to Torres because, under section 
318.03(A), she is the spouse wanting to give them life. The issue of contractual 
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ambiguity would be irrelevant because section 318.03(B) provides for a contractual 
override. The court of appeals mentions the statute and explains its effect, but notes 
that because the statute was not in effect when the trial court issued its order, the 
court of appeals is “not bound by it in reaching a resolution.”190 
Following section 318.03’s passage, the open questions now are (1) whether a 
state legislature and court can override procreative liberty by mandating a categorical 
“most likely to lead to birth” standard for pre-embryos disposition disputes and (2) 
whether a court or legislature can now go one step further and mandate donation of 
pre-embryos when both spouses wish to destroy them. The first may have been made 
inadvertently easier for Arizona by the Torres court of appeals because the court 
made the point of separating the question of procreative liberty rights from the pre-
embryo disposition analysis.191 The court of appeals also failed to make any mention 
of the propriety of forced third-party donation in the trial court’s order. This, coupled 
with the removal of assessing procreative rights in the analysis, may have opened the 
door much wider to mandatory donation.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
Probably the most pressing question that the Torres holdings and section 318.03 
present is whether they can be successfully challenged as violations of the 
constitutionally protected right to procreative liberty. From the Arizona courts’ 
perspectives, this right already bears upon this issue; the Torres court considered 
claims of constitutionally protected procreative rights,192 and the Jeter court 
recognized that any law concerning pre-embryos’ legal status is subject to 
constitutional restraints.193 While the Torres court of appeals declined to use such a 
“framework” when two individuals are in a disposition dispute and a prior agreement 
does not resolve the dispute, its reasoning would seem to be either that the individuals 
contracted away their claims to these rights or that the court, by being granted the 
power under a contract to decide a disposition dispute, is somehow no longer a 
government actor.194 While a discussion of whether individuals can contract their 
rights away in this manner is outside the scope of this Note, the reasoning of the court 
of appeals appears flawed. While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does 
sometimes permit individuals to give up constitutional rights, the context of pre-
embryo disposition disputes does not involve a regulatory actor, nor is the benefit in 
question, access to the courts to vindicate fundamental rights, a privilege.195 The 
effect of this reasoning would be to deprive a small class of people, those with 
predisposition agreements indicating disputes would be settled in court, of 
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vindicating their procreative rights vis-à-vis their pre-embryos in this court, an effect 
that is seemingly ripe for an equal protection challenge.  
Because of these issues, this Note takes the view that, consistent with prior 
Arizona court rulings, procreative rights are relevant to pre-embryo disposition 
disputes. As a result, Section A argues that constitutional challenges should be 
brought on both substantive due process and equal protection grounds while Section 
B asserts that procreative liberty protections should include procreation via IVF.  
A. Procreative Liberty is a Fundamental Right Protected by Substantive Due 
Process and Equal Protection 
The Supreme Court has articulated fundamental rights protected under 
substantive due process doctrine in different ways, but there are a few prevalent 
themes that run throughout this doctrine. First, “fundamental rights” are not just 
limited to those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.196 Rather, liberties that are 
“rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people”197 or “implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty” can be fundamental.198 It was articulated by Justice Harlan as “a 
rational continuum which . . . includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints and which also recognizes . . . that certain 
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgment.”199 
With this general understanding of fundamental rights, it is very likely that pre-
embryo disposition decisions would be protected from state infringement like the 
Torres court’s mandatory donation ruling and section 318.03’s contractual override 
provision. In discussing the similar effect of a New Mexico statute requiring 
implantation of all pre-embryos, scholars have concluded that such regulations 
implicate fundamental substantive due process rights because they bear upon an 
individual’s reproductive and decision-making rights by entailing a judgment about 
the legal status of the pre-embryo, which determines the weight of the state’s 
interest.200 Commentators have also called the Louisiana statute granting pre-
embryos personhood “constitutionally questionable.”201  
On the other hand, while the reasoning of the court of appeals vis-à-vis the 
relevance of procreative rights is questionable, the holding is less vulnerable to attack 
than either the trial court’s holding or section 318.03, because the court, in balancing 
the parties’ interests, weighted the likelihood of Torres ever becoming a parent by 
any means. It was this fact that the court of appeals relied on in deciding not to follow 
the general rule of preferencing the interests of the party wishing to avoid procreation 
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over the wishes of the party wishing to procreate in a case where two individuals’ 
procreative rights are diametrically opposed to each other—not to the state. Because 
the court’s reasoning is based on the parties’ interests (albeit not explicitly on their 
rights) and not the state’s interests, it will be harder for either party to show an 
unconstitutional infringement.202 The appeals court’s view that parties to a pre-
embryo dispute that have agreed to let the court adjudicate the dispute creates a class 
of people who are unable to bring their fundamental procreative rights to bear in the 
court’s decision, which raises equal protection concerns. But, because this challenge 
is less likely than those arising from forced pre-embryo adoption or implantation, the 
below analysis focuses primarily on the trial court’s ruling and section 318.03.  
If a reviewing court determines that pre-embryo disposition decision-making is a 
fundamental right, then laws regulating these decisions will likely have to pass strict 
scrutiny, which is almost always “fatal in fact.”203 In this case, it is likely that the 
Torres court’s ruling and section 318.03 would be invalidated under this framework. 
Strict scrutiny requires a compelling state interest and a narrowly-drawn statute,204 
and it is unlikely that Arizona’s interests in mandatory adoption or implantation 
would outweigh an individual’s interest in procreative liberty.  
1. State Interests 
Based on the court’s reasoning in Lifchez v. Hartigan, “[s]ince there is no 
compelling state interest sufficient to prevent a woman from terminating her 
pregnancy during the first trimester . . . there can be no such interest sufficient to 
intrude upon these other protected activities [for example, IVF].”205 While Lifchez 
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was decided before Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
when the Supreme Court discarded Roe v. Wade’s trimester test,206 this reasoning is 
still valid because abortion—in which there is a protected interest—always 
necessarily occurs later in fetal development than the pre-embryo stage.207  
Because none of the states’ interests in foundational reproductive rights cases like 
Skinner v. Oklahoma,208 Griswold v. Connecticut,209 Eisenstadt v. Baird,210 Carey v. 
Population Services, International,211 Roe,212 and Casey213 were enough to pass 
heightened review, it is unlikely that Arizona’s interest in mandatory pre-embryo 
donation or implantation will be considered compelling, which would keep the trial 
court ruling and statute from passing strict scrutiny. The only realistic articulation of 
Arizona’s interest is in protecting human life from the point of conception.214 In 
section 318.03, the state’s interest dictates the statutory outcome: pre-embryos are 
awarded to whichever spouse is likeliest to ensure their birth.215 The Torres court’s 
insistence that it was acting in furtherance of strong families and strong family values 
strongly implies that it considered a pre-embryo a family member. This is especially 
true since the court did not consider highly relevant factual matters such as the very 
low statistical likelihood that pre-embryos will actually become viable family 
members because pre-embryos are most likely to stop developing before the fetal 
stage.216 In addition, the court did not consider how many potential adoptive parents 
would be interested in and able to afford the invasive and expensive process of pre-
embryo adoption and implantation.  
Arizona’s interest runs afoul of cases like Roe and Casey, which have already put 
clear parameters around how a state can permissibly infringe on procreative liberty 
in the name of protecting human life, and to what degree the state’s interest begins 
to trump the mother’s interest once the fetus is viable.217 Because pre-embryos are 
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not fetuses, viability is impossible, and the state’s interest in protecting life cannot 
override parents’ liberty interests. 
One possible state justification that will not gain traction is the religious or moral 
belief in the sanctity of human life at any stage, which has never been strong enough 
to dictate outcomes in abortion cases. Much of the objection to abortion cases and 
the driving force behind “pro-life” measures have come from religiously-motivated 
actors.218 For instance, Louisiana’s heavily Catholic population helps to explain its 
embryonic personhood approach.219 And, in Arizona, the Thomas More Society—a 
national organization professing to “restor[e] respect in law for life, family, and 
religious liberty”220—helped to pass section 318.03.221 But, in Carey, the Court, 
while recognizing that teenage pregnancy could have devastating effects, would not 
accept that New York’s interest in protecting the morality of its citizens was 
compelling enough to override the procreative liberty of its citizens vis-à-vis 
contraception, several forms of which would prevent pre-embryos from 
implanting.222  
Morality will prove equally unavailing for Arizona. Justice O’Connor wrote in 
Casey that “[s]ome of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic 
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define 
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”223 Furthermore, decisions like 
Bowers v. Hardwick that were premised on purely moral justifications have since 
been overturned.224 Since the life-begins-at-conception campaign is largely, perhaps 
exclusively, concerned with religious and moral tenets and outcomes,225 a court 
adjudicating a pre-embryo disposition dispute should avoid prioritizing these 
interests over those of the gamete providers. While the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the government can use police powers to protect morality in other 
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doctrinal areas,226 the privacy cases make clear that this rationale cannot apply to 
deeply personal decisions made in protected contexts.  
Moreover, while much of the state’s interest in Torres was articulated as a desire 
for strong families and strong family values,227 this interest is unlikely to be viewed 
as compelling, nor the resultant restrictions appropriately tailored, when weighed 
against the individual gamete providers’ interests in procreative liberty. First, the 
phrases “strong families” and “strong family values” are likely coded language for 
the protection of life, addressed above.228 Second, the State in Griswold articulated 
analogous justifications when it attempted to justify contraception laws because they 
served its policy interest of discouraging adultery in order to protect the family 
unit.229 The Court found that the statute in question would not further the state’s 
interest, which caused it to fail the tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny.230 
Similarly, Arizona’s family policy justifications for forced pre-embryo donation and 
section 318.03 must fail. Given how unlikely it is for pre-embryos to end in live birth 
and the lack of evidence on the demand for pre-embryo adoption in Arizona,231 a 
court is very likely to determine that forced donation or a most-likely-to-lead-to-birth 
standard is not necessary for Arizona to promote strong families.232  
2. Individual Interests 
In terms of the individual spouses’ interests, the right to privacy is the 
fundamental right most strongly implicated in pre-embryo disputes. Given the 
Court’s privacy jurisprudence on abortion, contraception, and parental decision-
making, it is very likely that the question at the heart of pre-embryo disposition 
disputes, whether to “bear or beget” via ART, can be situated within one of these 
existing doctrines. While the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution, it has been understood to protect “personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education.”233 The doctrine began as an understanding of “penumbras” that 
“emanat[ed]” from enumerated protections in the Bill of Rights.234 While the Court 
has moved away from this “zones of privacy” view,235 personal decision-making in 
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certain contexts has continued to be protected as a fundamental right, and this 
protection has been extended over time to include marital decisions, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, and child-rearing236—all issues potentially 
implicated in a challenge to the Torres ruling or section 318.03. 
The right to procreate was established by the Supreme Court in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma. At the time, Oklahoma mandated that certain convicts be forcefully 
sterilized.237 The Court invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds, 
recognizing that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence 
and survival of the race.”238 Procreative liberty was then extended to protect the use 
of contraception for married couples.239 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the 
right to use contraception was extended via the Equal Protection Clause to single 
people.240 According to the Court, states cannot justify differential treatment by class, 
such as married versus unmarried contraception users, unless the legislation is 
“reasonable, not arbitrary, and . . . rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a 
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”241 Furthermore, the Court 
stated, “[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters 
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.”242  
The decision on whether to gestate or donate pre-embryos is obviously a “decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”243 In Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
acknowledged this relationship when it discussed the appellate court’s holding that 
allowing Mrs. Davis to implant the pre-embryos over Mr. Davis’s objection was a 
violation of his “constitutionally protected right not to beget a child where no 
pregnancy has taken place . . . .”244 
In addition, several forms of contraception work by preventing pre-embryonic 
development and implantation, which causes the cells to be passed during the 
woman’s menstrual cycle.245 Given this, Howell argues that “it is illogical to say she 
must treat the same embryos as protected human life when they are frozen in nitrous 
oxide.”246 In fact, it seems likely that it would violate the equal protection clause for 
a state to require otherwise, as in Eisenstadt. An equal protection challenge should 
be brought because the Torres ruling and section 318.03 both mandate that divorcing 
couples with pre-embryos be treated differently than married couples with pre-
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embryos, and couples who have undergone IVF be treated differently than couples 
achieving pregnancy coitally. 
3. Application of Abortion Jurisprudence 
Furthermore, post-Skinner, procreative liberty has been extended to the ability to 
end a pregnancy through abortion. While this protection is subject to restrictions and 
has been continually controversial since Roe,247 the core protection remains relatively 
unchanged.248 Further, even though viability can be used to limit procreative liberty 
in the abortion context,249 such concerns are inapposite to cryopreserved pre-embryos 
because they are undisputedly nonviable. While both the Roe and Casey courts 
recognized that a woman’s procreative liberty could be outweighed eventually by the 
state’s interest in protecting a viable fetus,250 the Court concluded that the exact point 
of fetal viability is still unknown.251 In contrast, it is known that pre-embryos are not 
viable. 
While abortion doctrine is a useful analogy, abortion and pre-embryo disposition 
are not the same thing. In abortion, pregnancy has already occurred, but this is not 
the case with pre-embryos. As a result, any potential “life-in-being” is at a very 
different stage of development in each procedure, and the woman’s physical integrity 
is implicated in different ways. Moreover, absent any affirmative termination 
measures, a pregnancy will usually result in a live birth.252 In contrast, pre-embryos, 
absent medical intervention, will stop developing; it would take the affirmative step 
of successful implantation to result in live birth.253 While this distinction between 
abortion and pre-embryo disposition may be relevant in determining which 
constitutional test to analyze Arizona pre-embryo disposition law under,254 it has also 
already been used by courts like Davis to illustrate the shared decision-making 
interests of both gamete providers255—but not that states like Arizona are free to 
usurp the reproductive decision-making role. 
Scholars in favor of greater personal liberty protections in pre-embryo dispute 
dispositions are likely to argue that privacy in the context of abortion jurisprudence 
supports a similar right to privacy in the context of forced pre-embryo donations or 
transfers of cryopreserved pre-embryos, but should not be imported as a standard.256 
Carrying abortion decisions over wholesale would mean that any challenges would 
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be evaluated under an undue burden standard, whereas a strict scrutiny approach 
would be more appropriate.257 
Others may argue that a right to procreative autonomy—or privacy in general—
is not even implicated in pre-embryo disposition because there is no pregnancy, and 
thus physical integrity is not a concern.258 But this view does not address the fact that 
cryopreservation alone implicates physical integrity because without it, women are 
likely to have to undergo additional rounds of expensive, invasive, and painful 
IVF.259 Furthermore, the outcome is then, in a state that mandates transfer or 
donation, that a gamete provider could become pregnant and then turn around and 
have a legal abortion to avoid an unwanted pregnancy.  
Finally, the Supreme Court is not only concerned with privacy rights germane to 
physical integrity, but also with privacy protections for personal autonomy 
manifested through choice. For instance, in Casey, the Court situated abortion 
decisions within two frameworks: one relating to “personal autonomy and bodily 
integrity” vis-à-vis the government’s constrained authority to force or deny medical 
treatment; and the other, a privacy doctrine which accords decision-making “liberty 
relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to 
beget or bear a child.”260 If the right to autonomous decision-making only existed in 
terms of physical integrity, there would be no need for the Court to include the 
application of privacy doctrine, which constitutes the bulk of the opinion.  
Privacy cases concerning family relationships, child-rearing, and marriage make 
this clear. For instance, in Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court concluded that 
states cannot infringe on individual liberty by prohibiting marriage based on racial 
distinctions.261 Sex is usually part of the marital relationship, and this could 
potentially be used as an argument for why physical integrity is implicated. However, 
if this attenuated relationship to physical integrity is enough, then the same should 
be true of the remote, but relevant, physical IVF procedures patients undergo.  
The same is true of the Court’s approach to family relationships and child-rearing. 
In discussing a law making it illegal for German to be taught in public schools, the 
Meyer v. Nebraska Court said that liberty under the Due Process Clause, “[w]ithout 
doubt[,] . . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint.”262 In Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, the Court applied Meyer to invalidate an Oregon law for impermissibly 
interfering with parents’ liberty to bring up and educate their children.263 In assessing 
parental rights, the Pierce Court stated that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of 
the [s]tate. . . .”264 This protection was subsequently extended from parents to those 
acting as a guardian for a child.265  
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B. Does Procreative Liberty Include IVF? 
While the Supreme Court has not considered the question of procreation by ART, 
like IVF, in light of privacy rights, it is likely, based on legal scholarship and state 
jurisprudence, that this type of deeply personal behavior would be protected under a 
right to privacy.266 Even as far back as 1979, when IVF was first emerging, the United 
States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare concluded that “[s]ince these 
rights are reasonably analogous to those recognized by the Court in Skinner, 
Griswold, and Eisenstadt, the argument might well be persuasive” in discussing 
whether there was a constitutional right to produce via IVF.267 Moreover, scholars 
addressing New Mexico’s law in the context of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Skinner 
have suggested that it will not withstand a challenge because it requires pre-embryo 
transfer and becoming a parent.268  
State and federal case law also suggest that IVF and cryopreservation decision-
making would be included in privacy rights.269 For instance, the Davis v. Davis court 
based its decision in part on two Supreme Court premises: the right to procreate 
established in Skinner and the right not to procreate established in Carey.270 In 
addition, in Lifchez v. Hartigan, a federal district court found a vague Illinois 
abortion law that restricted access to certain ART procedures invalid because it 
restricted a woman’s “right to make reproductive choices free of governmental 
interference with those choices”271—notwithstanding that the reproductive context 
was noncoital. The Lifchez court quoted Carey in saying “[t]he decision whether to 
beget or bear a child is at the very heart of . . . constitutionally protected choices,”272 
including “the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather 
than prevent, pregnancy.”273 
An additional question is whether, if pre-embryo disposition decision-making 
implicates a privacy right, the right applies to both gamete providers. Case law, 
especially state supreme court cases applying a balancing test, suggests that it does, 
even though it may not apply equally in all contexts.274 Legal scholars reason that, 
unlike in abortion decisions where the procreative rights of pregnant women are 
protected over those of their partners,275 in pre-embryo dispositions the woman’s 
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physical integrity is not implicated in the same way, which evens the playing field 
for both gamete providers.276 
Despite this, the Torres court was unsure about whether Terrell had a 
constitutional right not to procreate even while it recognized that Torres had a 
constitutional right to procreate.277 According to the court, it was “unclear whether 
there is a constitutional right not to procreate but Husband cites no law to support 
such an argument; nor has the Court been able to identify any such citations.”278 The 
court went on to say that neither Torres nor Terrell has a constitutional right to 
procreate with each other279 and that, in any event, they waived this right by signing 
the disposition agreement that required mutual consent to transfer their pre-
embryos.280 There is no authority given for either of these propositions,281 and, given 
that the Arizona court found the agreement fatally ambiguous,282 it is odd to rely on 
that same agreement in this part of the analysis.  
One final point is that the composition of the current Supreme Court complicates 
the analysis of whether the decisions of gamete providers in pre-embryo dispositions 
will be protected as fundamental rights.283 Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kagan, and 
Sotomayor tend to take more liberal stances on these issues whereas Justices Alito, 
Gorsuch, Roberts, and Thomas tend to take more conservative views.284 Recently-
appointed Justice Kavanaugh is also a conservative and was appointed by a 
Republican president.285 With five conservative votes, it is unclear if the Court will 
extend a substantive due process right to gamete providers. The Court could instead 
take a narrow view of substantive due process rights vis-à-vis what is “rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people” or “implicit in the concept of ordered 
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liberty.”286 If the Court does so, then, almost by definition, ART cannot be a 
historically considered traditional right that is fundamental to our concept of 
liberty.287 
CONCLUSION 
 Given the deeply personal nature of pre-embryo disposition decisions, it is very 
likely that laws like Arizona’s Torres trial court ruling and section 318.03 could be 
challenged on privacy grounds. In addition, these laws are likely vulnerable to equal 
protection challenges because they draw distinctions between the procreative rights 
of people pregnant by coital means versus those undergoing ART. In contrast, 
holdings like the Torres court of appeals are less vulnerable to constitutional 
challenges because they focus on the individual interests instead of the policy 
interests of the state.  
However, even if mandatory donation and implantation are somehow 
constitutionally permissible, the Torres trial court ruling and section 318.03 are still 
problematic because of the unresolved legal issues they raise. For instance, while 
section 318.03 removes parental responsibility from the gamete provider who is not 
awarded the pre-embryos, the ruling in Torres does not address what kind of legal 
rights and responsibilities Torres and Terrell will retain over any live birth that results 
from their pre-embryos. In addition, both laws raise questions as to the status of the 
legal pre-embryo. If Arizona is now taking a pre-embryo-as-person approach, then 
questions like whether pre-embryos can sue, be sued, or receive inheritances must be 
answered. While the Torres court justified its ruling in part on a desire to avoid 
creating litigation,288 it is undoubtedly the case that the now opened legal questions 
raised by it and section 318.03 will have the opposite effect.  
In addition to legal issues, cryopreservation is a useful procedure, use of which 
Arizona’s recent laws could chill. Not only is IVF invasive and painful, but it is 
expensive.289 At the same time, transferring multiple pre-embryos can be dangerous 
and lead to multiple pregnancies, which many patients, doctors, and states have 
recognized as problematic.290 As a result, Arizona law currently presents patients 
seeking IVF in Arizona with tough choices that could affect their health.  
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Finally, these laws run the serious risk of denying gamete providers access to the 
courts. Parties like Torres and Terrell now run the risk of having neither of their 
interests met if they adjudicate a pre-embryo dispute. In fact, the Arizona legislature 
has explicitly provided that if a predisposition agreement “is brought before the 
court” in a divorce proceeding,291 it will not bind the court. This language currently 
stands as a warning to Arizona gamete providers not to adjudicate disposition 
disputes if they want to retain decision-making authority over disposition decisions. 
At the same time, the legislature’s decision is at odds with the statement of both 
Torres courts that they should be guided by the contract, if possible.  
For these reasons, intended parents in Arizona who are struggling with infertility 
should proceed with caution. Arizona is in unsettled territory insofar as pre-embryo 
dispositions are concerned, and until the procreative liberty issues raised by forced 
donation and implantation are settled, there is a new law in town.  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
Approach, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 559, 563 (2010); Jane E. Brody, Some I.V.F. Experts 
Discourage Multiple Births, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/well/family/experts-advise-minimizing-multiple 
-births-through-ivf.html [https://perma.cc/AC8N-LWSA]. 
 291. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (Supp. 2018). 
